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Notes
Confronting Williams: The Confrontation
Clause and Forensic Witnesses in the
Post-Williams Era
Taryn Jones*
In Williams v. Illinois, the division of the U.S. Supreme Court created substantial
confusion as to the proper application of the Confrontation Clause to forensic witnesses.
In the decision, the Court affirmed the conviction of the defendant, Sandy Williams,
because the plurality and Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, determined that the DNA
profile produced by an outside laboratory was not testimonial and thus Williams did not
have a constitutional right to cross-examine the laboratory analysts. The plurality and the
concurrence, however, presented two distinct rationales for deeming the report
nontestimonial. The case has consequently left lower courts without firm guidance as to
when forensic reports are testimonial.
This Note critically examines two state responses to the testimonial nature of autopsy
reports following the confusion created by the Williams decision, and whether testimony
of surrogate witnesses on these reports under the current legal interpretation violates the
Confrontation Clause.
I will argue that this confusion creates a demand for judicial restraint. Courts should err
on the side of excluding evidence in order to preserve the Sixth Amendment
confrontation right.

* Production Editor, Hastings Law Journal; J.D. Candidate 2016, University of California
Hastings College of the Law. Thank you to the staff of the Hastings Law Journal for all of their work
on this Note. Thank you also to my family and loved ones for their patience and unwavering support.
And a special thank you to Sean Timm for lending me his strength whenever mine began to fail.
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Introduction
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees that
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
1
confronted with the witnesses against him.” The clause generally
prohibits the use of out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of
2
the matter asserted when the declarant is unavailable to testify. By
requiring that a witness present her evidence on the stand and be subject
to cross-examination, the Confrontation Clause gives a defendant the
opportunity to probe into the potential deficiencies of a witness’
3
testimony. As a result, this right gives criminal defendants the
opportunity to show the potential incompetence of a witness or to
4
awaken the conscience of a fraudulent one. Accordingly, the protections
provided by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment are

1.
2.
3.
4.

U.S. Const. amend. VI.
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004).
Sixth Amendment at Trial, 34 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 594, 604–05 (2005).
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318–19 (2009).
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critical to ensuring the right to a fair trial. Courts, however, have steadily
5
eroded this right.
In particular, the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Williams v.
Illinois critically diminished a defendant’s right to cross-examine forensic
6
witnesses. There, a plurality of the Court determined that the lab
technician from an independent laboratory, which ran the original DNA
sample found on the victim, was not required to testify because the
7
results were not testimonial. Instead, the sole testimony of the Illinois
State Police forensic specialist who matched the defendant’s DNA
8
sample to the independent report was sufficient, and accordingly, the
defendant had no right to confront the independent lab technician who
9
ran the initial test. As a whole, the Williams plurality provided little
guidance to lower courts as to when forensic evidence must be submitted
by those directly responsible for its production or when it can be
10
11
submitted by other “surrogate” witnesses. Consequently, as courts
12
have interpreted the decision in a variety of ways, the diverse
applications of Williams have left defendants vulnerable to inconsistent
and unpredictable applications of the Confrontation Clause.
This Note explores the confusion resulting from the split of the
Williams Court and concludes that these uncertainties demand judicial
restraint and deference to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
confrontation right. Part I will explore the pre-Williams decisions that
13
developed the “testimonial” doctrine which now lies at the center of the

5. See John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination,
and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 191, 220 (1999) (describing the
Confrontation Clause as a “shrinking right” and explaining that this shrinking trend is due to judicial
concerns regarding the “all-or-nothing choice the rule imposes”).
6. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
7. Id. at 2228.
8. Id. at 2227–28.
9. Id.
10. For the purposes of this Note, a surrogate witness or surrogate testimony will refer to a
witness or testimony presented by an individual who had little or no involvement in the production of
the forensic evidence presented at trial. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011)
(denying surrogate testimony by “a scientist who did not sign the certification or perform or observe
the test reported in the certification”); see also Marc D. Ginsberg, The Confrontation Clause and
Forensic Autopsy Reports—A “Testimonial,” 74 La. L. Rev. 117, 121 (2013) (explaining that forensic
pathology results can be presented by “the examining pathologist—the pathologist who performed the
forensic autopsy on the victim and prepared the autopsy report” or presented by “a ‘surrogate’
pathologist, one who was not the examining pathologist, from the office of the coroner or medical
examiner”).
11. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[The plurality has] left significant
confusion in their wake.”).
12. See, e.g., United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (determining that Williams
created no binding precedence); State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 437 (N.M. 2013) (calculating which
principles five justices could agree upon).
13. Testimonial statements, defined by Crawford v. Washington and its progeny as formal
statements or those statements given in preparation for trial, give rise to the Confrontation Clause and
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Confrontation Clause discussion, while Part II will examine forensic
science in the context of wrongful convictions. Scholars have emphasized
14
the danger of faulty forensic science and this Note will echo these
concerns, which strongly suggest that forensic science does not warrant
the amount of reverence it typically receives from courts. Because crossexamination is an essential safeguard against wrongful convictions,
forensic scientists do not warrant special treatment with regard to
confrontation rights.
Part III will present Williams v. Illinois. As this case is of particular
importance to the discussion of forensic witnesses, it is discussed in three
parts: (1) the underlying facts; (2) the conflict between the plurality,
Justice Thomas’ concurrence, and the dissent; and (3) a brief
introduction to the resulting confusion among lower courts. Part IV then
15
reviews two state cases —People v. Dungo and State v. Navarette—that
attempted to deal with the Confrontation Clause in the aftermath of
Williams. Both cases addressed the admissibility of testimony regarding
autopsies presented by surrogate pathologists either not directly
16
responsible, or entirely uninvolved, in the autopsy itself. Both cases
dealt with similar facts, and yet, reached contrary results on whether the
forensic evidence was admissible, emphasizing the malleability of the
Williams decision. These decisions further demonstrate that Williams has
left defendants unduly vulnerable to inconsistent applications of the
Sixth Amendment. This Note recommends that judges err on the side of
exclusion of forensic evidence submitted by a witness not directly
involved in its production. This is necessary to reduce the risk of
wrongful convictions resulting from inconsistent applications of Williams
and to preserve a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
I. The Confrontation Clause Before WILLIAMS
Part I discusses the development of the “testimonial” standard
introduced in Crawford v. Washington, which requires that defendants be
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses whose statements
are either formal or given under circumstances where their use at trial
17
would be reasonably foreseeable. It will also address the establishment

its protections. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004); see infra Part I. By “testimonial
doctrine,” this Note refers to these guiding cases and the standard for determining whether a
statement is testimonial, as described therein.
14. See generally Barry Scheck et al., Actual Innocence: When Justice Goes Wrong and
How to Make It Right (2003) (detailing real-life stories of how DNA testing has often destroyed
supposed solid evidence that condemned people to death).
15. Because the Confrontation Clause was incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment, the
right extends to state prosecutions. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
16. See infra Part IV.
17. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52.
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18

of the “primary purpose” inquiry into the testimonial standard.
Pursuant to the primary purpose test a statement may not be testimonial
if its primary purpose was not for prosecution even where its use at trial
19
was foreseeable. Part I will then discuss the application of these
standards in the context of forensic science both in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, which determined that the
defendant has the right to confront the forensic scientist directly
20
responsible for the production of results.
A. Background Leading up to WILLIAMS
The Confrontation Clause provides a criminal defendant the right to
21
cross-examine an adverse witness. The admission of hearsay evidence
implicates this right because the defendant must be afforded the
22
opportunity to confront the out-of-court declarant. Under the hearsay
rule, the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit the admission of out-of23
court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted, absent
24
some qualifying exception. Whether a statement is “offered for the
25
truth of the matter asserted” is admittedly an unclear standard that
26
even divides the Supreme Court, but it generally means statements
27
offered into evidence for the truth of their contents. The “declarant,”
meanwhile, is the person who made the statement, which is the oral,
28
written, or nonverbal conduct intended as an assertion. Ultimately, this
evidentiary prohibition, coupled with the right to cross-examination, is
an essential protection against the accusations of noncredible sources.

18. See infra Part I.B.
19. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
20. See infra Subparts I.C. and I.D.
21. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
22. Sixth Amendment at Trial, supra note 3, at 612–13.
23. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c).
24. See Fed. R. Evid. 803, 804, 807. While important to the admissibility of out-of-court
statements, these exceptions will not be addressed in this Note.
25. Jennifer L. Mnookin & David H. Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert Evidence and the
Confrontation Clause, 2012 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99, 101 (emphasis added) (“The phrase is more easily
remembered than understood. What it means to introduce an item of evidence ‘for the truth of the
matter asserted’ has confused generations of law students, lawyers, and jurists.”).
26. See generally Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (disagreeing as to whether the
Cellmark report was offered for the truth of the matter asserted).
27. For example, if the statement “I saw the Queen of England at the mall on February 8th” is
offered to show that in fact the Queen was at the mall, then the statement is offered for the truth of
the matter asserted. If, however, the statement is offered as circumstantial evidence to show the
declarant’s mental state (perhaps the declarant has certain mental delusions), then it is not offered for
its truth. For an introduction to the hearsay rule, see Roger C. Park, Hearsay from Square One: The
Definition of Hearsay, CALI, http://www.cali.org/lessons/web/evd08/jq.php#Contents (last visited Apr.
8, 2016).
28. Fed. R. Evid. 801(a)–(b).
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As finders of fact, juries carry the responsibility of determining
whether the declarant is a credible source and is telling the truth when
testifying in court. For instance, the jury may observe the witness’
29
demeanor during cross-examination to determine if that witness is lying.
If the jury determines that a witness is not credible, the evidence
presented by that witness would lose its influence as well. Without this
vetting process, the reliability of out-of-court statements would be
relatively unknown and defendants would be susceptible to incompetent
or fraudulent attacks by out-of-court declarants.
Overall, the Confrontation Clause, which only applies to criminal
cases, provides an additional barrier against the admission of such out-ofcourt statements by granting defendants the constitutional right to
30
confront their accusers. A defendant has a right, under the
Confrontation Clause, to subject a witness to the rigors of the adversarial
system, probing into the witness’ potential deficiencies in knowledge and
31
credibility through cross-examination at trial.
Although the clause promises increased protection for defendants,
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in Ohio
v. Roberts added little to the protections already afforded by the general
32
prohibition against hearsay. Under Roberts, the Court held that out-ofcourt statements were admissible if the declarant was unavailable and the
statements fell within a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception or had
33
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Moreover, the Court
even loosened the requirement for unavailability, explaining that a
34
“demonstration of unavailability, however, is not always required.” The
Court, therefore, set an extraordinarily low threshold for the admissibility of
statements of adverse witnesses not subject to cross-examination, and as a
result, allowed trial judges to use substantial discretion for the admission
of out-of-court statements. Regardless of the witness’ availability, the
prosecution could conceivably circumvent the defendant’s confrontation
35
right by merely arguing that a statement was trustworthy. In light of
these consequences, the Roberts decision was discarded twenty-four
36
years later in Crawford v. Washington.
In Crawford, the Court rejected the “trustworthiness” rationale and
instead adopted a standard to exclude hearsay statements that are

29. See James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 Cath. U. L. Rev. 903, 911 (2000).
30. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
31. Sixth Amendment at Trial, supra note 3, at 602, 605.
32. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (“The historical evidence leaves little doubt,
however, that the Clause was intended to exclude some hearsay.”).
33. Id. at 65–66.
34. Id. at 65 n.7 (emphasis added).
35. See Peter Nicolas, ‘I’m Dying to Tell You What Happened’: The Admissibility of Testimonial
Dying Declarations Post-Crawford, 37 Hastings Const. L.Q. 487, 490–91 (2010).
36. 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004).
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37

deemed “testimonial.” By requiring courts to determine the purpose
38
and formality of out-of-court statements, this standard provided greater
structure and guidance for lower courts determining the admissibility of
statements offered without the opportunity for cross-examination.
Before the Williams decision, Crawford and its progeny developed and
39
applied this testimonial standard and generally enforced a confrontation
40
right that was more robust in nature.
B. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
41

Marking a dramatic shift in Confrontation Clause doctrine, the
42
Crawford Court rejected the traditional trustworthiness standard
established in Ohio v. Roberts. Writing the opinion for the Court, Justice
Scalia explained, “[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with the jury trial because a
defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment
43
prescribes.”
In Crawford, the defendant was charged with assault and attempted
44
murder for stabbing a man. At trial, the prosecution offered a statement
made by the defendant’s wife during a police interrogation to refute the
45
defendant’s self-defense claim. While the defendant claimed that the
victim had reached for a weapon prior to the fight, the wife, who
witnessed the stabbing, indicated to the police that she did not believe
46
the victim had a weapon. Because his wife asserted marital privilege and
47
refused to testify at trial, the defendant argued that the use of her outof-court statement violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront
48
49
“witnesses against him.” The Court agreed with him.
The Supreme Court determined, in a 7-2 majority, that the
admissibility of the wife’s out-of-court statement was dependent upon
50
the “testimonial” nature of the statement. In other words, without the
opportunity to cross-examine, out-of-court statements would be
considered inadmissible if they have the quality of “bear[ing] testimony”
37. Id. at 51.
38. See infra notes 52–54.
39. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60; see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (introducing
the “primary purpose” analysis to the test for testimonial statements).
40. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009).
41. See Ginsberg, supra note 10, at 122.
42. 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 38.
45. Id. at 40.
46. Id. at 39–40.
47. Id. at 40.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 68.
50. Id. at 51.
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51

similar to in-court statements. The Court continued and established
three general characterizations for such testimonial statements. First,
52
formal statements are commonly held to be testimonial. The Court
explained that “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to
government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes
53
a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.” Second, statements
54
prepared for prosecution are also generally deemed testimonial. If a
declarant would reasonably believe that her statements would be used in
55
a later trial, then the declarant should be subject to cross-examination.
Third, the Court held that such out-of-court testimonial statements are
inadmissible “unless [the declarant] was unavailable to testify, and the
56
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” This
narrow exception ensures that the defendant retains the right to confront
her accusers, even if that confrontation cannot take place before a jury.
As a result of this doctrine, out-of-court statements closely akin to
in-court testimony must be subject to cross-examination in order to be
57
admissible. For example, statements like those made to an investigator
would be inadmissible without opportunity for cross-examination
because they “bear testimony” against the defendant. In other words,
these statements would be considered “testimonial” because they are
formal (that is, stated to a government official) and are reasonably
58
foreseen by the declarant to be used at trial. If, however, the declarant
was unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross59
examine the declarant, the statements would be admissible.
Alternatively, if the statements were nontestimonial, they would not
60
invoke Confrontation Clause protection. Overall, Crawford provided
much less discretion for the admissibility of out-of-court statements.
Under this standard, if statements fell within the categories of “formal”
or “foreseeable use at trial,” but failed to fall within the narrow
exceptions of “unavailable” and “prior opportunity to cross-examine,”
then the statements would be inadmissible regardless of whether the
judge considered them trustworthy.

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 52.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 54.
57. Mark K. Hanasono, The Muddled State: California’s Application of Confrontation Clause
Jurisprudence in People v. Dungo and People v. Lopez, 41 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1, 3 (2013).
58. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
59. See id. at 54, 59.
60. Id. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’
design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law . . . .”).
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C. DAVIS V. WASHINGTON
In Davis v. Washington, the Court introduced the “primary
61
purpose” test to the testimonial inquiry. Under this standard, the Court
explained that statements made by a declarant having a reasonable
foreseeability that they will be used in prosecution could still be
admissible if the primary purpose of those statements was not for use at
62
trial. The Davis Court held that these types of statements are not
63
testimonial and, therefore, do not give rise to the Confrontation Clause.
64
In Davis, a victim of a domestic dispute called 911. During the call,
the 911 operator asked questions that led to statements by the assailant
65
and the victim that incriminated the defendant. At trial, the victim did
not testify, and the prosecution instead played the recording of the 911
66
call. The Court determined that the out-of-court statement was
admissible, despite the defendant’s inability to cross-examine the victim,
because the primary purpose of the call was to solicit aid, not to
67
investigate for prosecution. In the decision, the Court explained,
“[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
68
ongoing emergency.” However, the Court indicated that statements are
testimonial when “the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
69
later criminal prosecution.” Consequently, in determining the primary
purpose of the statements, it is relevant to consider the circumstances
that gave rise to the statements as well as the intent of both the
70
investigator and the declarant.
D. MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Court effectively concluded
that “forensic laboratory reports are testimonial for purposes of the
71
Confrontation Clause.” The defendant in Melendez-Diaz was apprehended
72
and detained in the back of a police car, and, after the drive to the police
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
Id.
Id. at 829.
Id. at 817–18.
Id.
Id. at 819.
Id. at 822.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Richard D. Friedman, The Sky Is Still Not Falling, 20 J.L. & Pol’y 427, 429 (2012).
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308 (2009).
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station, during which the detained made “furtive movements,” officers
searched the police vehicle and found several bags containing a
73
substance resembling cocaine. The officers then submitted the bags for
74
lab analysis. At trial, the prosecution offered three certificates of
analysis that disclosed the results of the lab testing, which indicated that
75
the bags did in fact contain cocaine.
The Court determined, following a “rather straightforward
76
application” of Crawford, that the “affidavits were testimonial
statements, and the analysts were ‘witnesses’ for purposes of the Sixth
77
Amendment.” After quickly determining the testimonial nature of the
reports, Justice Scalia systematically presented and rejected the arguments
78
given by the dissent. For the purposes of this Note, Justice Scalia’s
rejection of the dissent’s claim that the testimony at issue should be
admissible because it was the “resul[t] of neutral, scientific testing” is of
79
the greatest relevance.
Justice Scalia stated that the dissent’s argument was “little more
than an invitation to return to [the] overruled” trustworthiness standard
80
of Roberts, and frankly rejected this reversion. He went on to attack the
81
merits of the claim, and rightfully so. As Richard D. Friedman later
explained in his article, “[l]ab testing, while usually accurate, is far from
foolproof. Nor can agents of the government properly be called neutral
82
in a criminal prosecution.” With deliberate strikes, Justice Scalia
83
proceeded to plainly demonstrate the fallibility of forensic science.
First, he acknowledged the existence of fraud within the scientific
84
community. In particular, the opinion emphasized “drylabbing,” a
practice in which forensic scientists report results to tests that were never
85
conducted, as a primary example of fraudulent behavior. It is here in
particular that the Confrontation Clause can bring to light the untruths
of a forensic witness’ testimony. As Justice Scalia explained, “[w]hile it is
true, as the dissent notes, that an honest analyst will not alter his

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 312.
77. Id. at 311.
78. Friedman, supra note 71, at 429 (“This gave Justice Scalia a chance to clear away a good deal
of underbrush, as one by one—quite correctlyhe set these arguments aside.”).
79. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 317.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 317–21.
82. Friedman, supra note 71, at 430.
83. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318–21.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 319; see also Scheck et al., supra note 14, at 140 (“It was powerful evidence, with one
slight problem: Zain’s laboratory couldn’t perform those tests . . . . He had made up a story to make
people happy about a suspect.”).
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testimony . . . the analyst who provides false results may, under oath in
86
open court, reconsider his false testimony.” Moreover, he posited that
confrontation may act to deter fraudulent analysis before the defendant
87
is ever even charged and brought to trial.
Next, Justice Scalia addressed the possibility of incompetent
88
analysts. He asserted that confrontation can bring to light an analyst’s
89
improper or insufficient training and any deficiencies in judgment.
While forensic science, “the gold standard” of evidence, is often viewed
as purely objective, it involves a great deal of subjective interpretation
90
and is therefore subject to human error. Moreover, highlighting recent
DNA exonerations, Justice Scalia also illustrated the existence of faulty
91
forensics. “[T]he legal community now concedes,” Justice Scalia
explained, “with varying degrees of urgency, that our system produces
92
erroneous convictions based on discredited forensics.” Thus, not only is
science subject to error due to the analyst’s misinterpretations but the
science presented may not be real “science” at all. These flaws can be
discovered and presented to the jury upon cross-examination, but only if
the forensic analyst testifies at trial. The Court reconsidered this decision
regarding the standard for surrogate testimony just two years later in
Bullcoming v. New Mexico.
E. BULLCOMING V. NEW MEXICO
Reaffirming the Melendez-Diaz decision, Bullcoming v. New Mexico
asserted that admitting lab reports through the testimony of a surrogate
93
witness violated the Confrontation Clause. In Bullcoming, the
defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated, leading the trial
court to admit a lab report certifying that his blood alcohol concentration
94
was above the legal limit. At trial, the prosecution did not call the
analyst who conducted the tests and prepared the report because he was
95
on unpaid leave. Instead, a surrogate analyst, who was familiar with the
lab’s testing, but who “neither observed nor reviewed” the testing of the
96
defendant’s blood sample, sponsored the report.
The Court rejected the New Mexico Supreme Court’s argument that
the defendant’s “true accuser” was the machine that the analyst used to
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318–19.
Id. at 319.
Id.
Id. at 320.
Scheck et al., supra note 14, at 157–58.
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 319.
Id. (quoting Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 475, 491 (2006)).
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011).
Id. at 2709.
Id. at 2709, 2716.
Id. at 2712.
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97

conduct the test. Rather, the Court determined that the analyst, being
more than a “mere scrivener” of the machine, was the defendant’s
accuser because the analyst needed specialized skill and knowledge to
98
operate the machine and interpret its results. Furthermore, the Court
decided that surrogate testimony was insufficient to demonstrate any
99
errors the original analyst might have made, asserting:
[S]urrogate testimony of the kind [the surrogate] was equipped to give
could not convey what [the analyst] knew or observed about the events
his certification concerned, [that is,] the particular test and testing
process he employed. Nor could such surrogate testimony expose any
100
lapses or lies on the certifying analyst’s part.

Furthermore, the Court determined that the report was formally
101
certified and its primary purpose was for use in prosecution. The Court
explained that when a report is “created solely for an ‘evidentiary
102
Consequently, the
purpose,’” the report “ranks as testimonial.”
surrogate testimony violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights
because the defendant was not afforded the opportunity to cross103
examine the analyst directly responsible for the results. Overall, the
sheer space for error in forensic analysis leaves far too much room for
wrongful conviction and fraud.
II. Forensic Science and Wrongful Convictions
To understand such lapses in the perceived sanctity of forensic
sciences, one need only look to a handful of its failings. On January 22,
104
1987, a man in a ski mask, carrying a knife, attacked a young woman.
Three weeks later, another woman was attacked, but she was able to see
105
her attacker’s reddish-brown beard. Glen Dale Woodall was later
convicted of these crimes, despite conflicting evidence, the victims’
106
and Woodall’s unwavering assertion of
hypnotized accusations,
107
innocence.

97. Id. at 2714.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2715.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2712 n.6.
102. Id. at 2717.
103. Id.
104. Scheck et al., supra note 14, at 142.
105. Id.
106. Id. (“After hypnosis, both victims said that Woodall was their attacker, recognized both by his
appearance and a singular scent.”). While beyond the scope of this Note, hyponotized accusations or
confessions are highly controversial and typically inadmissible as evidence. See Daniel R. Webert,
Note, Are the Courts in a Trance? Approaches to the Admissibility of Hypnotically Enhanced Witness
Testimony in Light of Empirical Evidence, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1301, 1306–08 (2003).
107. Id. at 142–43.
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The primary witness used in the prosecution’s case-in-chief was Fred
Salem Zain, the state trooper in charge of serology for Virginia’s crime
108
Zain testified that forensic tests performed on the
laboratory.
attacker’s and Woodall’s blood and semen proved that “only six in ten
thousand people could have attacked the woman, and Glen Dale
109
Woodall was a member of that very narrow group.” However, Zain’s
laboratory did not have the ability to conduct those tests and, even if he
could, his statistics, according to a state investigator, were “off by a
110
mile.” In fact, in this case Zain’s statistics were not just “off”; they were
111
outright fabricated. Even more alarming, this was not the first time
112
Zain had concocted false lab results. As the Woodall story came to
light, the State of Virginia—which convicted Woodall and employed
Zain—conducted an investigation into Zain’s body of work, and it
discovered that in a sampling of thirty-six cases Zain had testified in, he
113
“faked data in every case.”
In this way, forensic science is a double-edged sword. It has the
ability to help solve crimes and convict the guilty, but it also has the
114
capacity to condemn the innocent. The story of Zain and his morally
disastrous career is not just anecdotal. Faulty forensics, including both
fraudulent and incompetent analysis, contributed to forty-seven percent
115
of the first confirmed wrongful convictions, totaling over 150 cases.
Moreover, as the number of wrongful convictions continues to rise as a
result of subsequent DNA exoneration, many scholars believe this is only
116
“the tip of a much larger iceberg.” Thus, it is clear that forensic science
is far from infallible. As Barry Scheck of the Innocence Project and his
coauthors explain, “[w]hat passes for ‘scientific evidence’ in courtrooms
frequently goes unchallenged, and carries tremendous weight with jurors
panning for nuggets of truth in the muddy river of conflicting stories and
rickety memories. Too often, though, the ‘scientific evidence’ is fool’s
117
gold.” Forensic science, consequently, can be dangerous because of its
inherently persuasive nature. Defendants require a strengthened
confrontation right to combat this danger.
108. Id. at 140.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 140, 146.
114. See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful
Convictions, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2009) (explaining that “scientific advances led to Dotson’s
exoneration, but invalid forensic science testimony had also supported his conviction”).
115. The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
causes-wrongful-conviction (last visited Apr. 8, 2016) (explaining that faulty forensics contributed to 154
cases of the first 325 confirmed wrongful convictions).
116. See, e.g., Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 114, at 8.
117. Scheck et al., supra note 14, at 141.
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Because the defense subjected Zain to cross-examination, but still
failed to expose the fraudulent analysis, it is arguable that confrontation
is an ineffective tool against forensic science and therefore does not
warrant additional protections from the Supreme Court. Other scholars
have advocated alternative methods of control over forensic witnesses,
including measures such as external audits to monitor the quality and
118
and even the complete exclusion of
proficiency of laboratories,
evidence from scientific fields deemed unreliable in order to galvanize
119
reform. While these are excellent additional steps that should be taken
to guard against faulty forensics and its impact on wrongful convictions,
the role of cross-examination should not be undervalued.
As John Henry Wigmore explained, cross-examination is “the
120
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.” This is
especially true given the central nature of the adversarial system in the
121
The U.S. courts are unlikely to shift the
U.S. justice system.
responsibility away from the parties to establish the deficiencies of a
122
witness’ testimony. Thus, if a forensic scientist were to overcome the
proposed pretrial safeguards, cross-examination would still be needed to
expose any lies and inconsistencies. Just as Justice Scalia explained in
Melendez-Diaz, cross-examination is an essential tool for exposing faulty
123
forensic science. Yet, its effectiveness is greatly undermined if the
124
responsible witness is not required to take the stand. So, while forensic
witnesses like Zain should indeed be subject to additional safeguards like
audits, if unreliable or fraudulent science does make it into the
courtroom, the defendant should be assured that the responsible witness
will be subject to the full force of the adversarial system.
Additionally, cross-examination is a tool that is already available
and it should therefore be duly protected. While proposed pretrial
safeguards may deter faulty forensics in the future, criminal defendants
must rely on their confrontation rights as these proposed safeguards take
effect. Moreover, confrontation rights are constitutional safeguards,

118. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate
Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 163, 163 (2007) (“[Q]uality assurance programs, including proficiency
testing and external audits, should be mandated.”).
119. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A Path Forward
Fraught With Pitfalls, 2 Utah L. Rev. 225, 246 (2010) (“Exclusion is a blunt instrument to try to coerce
forensic science to reform, but in the end it may be the only one we are left with.”).
120. Kent Roach, Wrongful Convictions: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Themes, 35 N.C. J. Int’l L.
& Com. Reg. 387, 393 (2010) (quoting 3 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American
System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law 27 (2d ed. 1923)).
121. Id. at 416 (explaining that the United States is unlikely to adopt elements of an inquisitorial
system that would shift the responsibility from the jury to judges to determine the merits of a forensic
witness’ testimony).
122. Id.
123. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318–20 (2009).
124. Id.
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meaning they cannot be disregarded or replaced because alternative
protections exist. Even if additional protections are added, the right to
confront adverse witnesses must still be ensured. Because the adversarial
125
system is essential in the United States and is embraced in its
constitutional precepts, better cross-examination should be pursued in
tandem with other suggested protections.
Wrongful convictions not only emphasize the need for crossexamination to expose potential inaccuracies and fraud among forensic
scientists, but they also act as a reminder that Sixth Amendment
protections apply to everyone. The criminal defendants discussed in Part
IV of this Note are likely perpetrators of horrendous crimes. In fact, in
126
People v. Dungo, the central issue of the case was not whether Dungo
127
strangled and killed his girlfriend, but for how long he strangled her.
When met with facts such as these, it might be difficult to remain neutral
as to inclusion of incriminating evidence, but for such reasons, it is
essential to keep in mind that the right to confront “witnesses against
him” is not only Dungo’s right, but is also the right of Woodall and every
other defendant who retains a presumption of innocence in the face of
128
criminal charges.
III. The WILLIAMS Decision and the Resulting Confusion
Despite the rather straightforward decisions made in the cases
preceding it, the plurality in Williams v. Illinois generally disregards the
precedence surrounding surrogate testimony for forensic evidence. Due
to a flip in the voting composition, the divided Court dramatically shifted
its position on the admissibility of surrogate testimony for forensic
science. In Melendez-Diaz, the majority was comprised of Justices Scalia,
129
Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, with Justice Thomas joining
130
with a concurring opinion. While between Melendez-Diaz and the
decision in Bullcoming the composition of the Court changed, Justice
131
Sotomayor and Justice Kagan replacing Justices Souter and Stevens,
the voting configuration remained much the same. This normalcy would,
however, cease to be the case three years later when Williams came
before the Court.
125. See supra note 121.
126. People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442 (Cal. 2012).
127. Id. at 446.
128. See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 452 (1895) (“The law presumes that persons
charged with crime are innocent until they are proven by competent evidence to be guilty.”).
129. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 306 (2009).
130. Id. at 329 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I continue to adhere to my position that ‘the
Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.’”).
131. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, Sup. Ct. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/members_text.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
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In Williams, the dissenters in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming
132
became the plurality. Justice Alito wrote that opinion and was joined
133
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Breyer. The
plurality determined the forensic report was nontestimonial because it
134
was not presented for the truth of the matter asserted. Justice Thomas
wrote a concurring opinion that disagreed with all aspects of the plurality
decision, but still found the report nontestimonial because it was
135
insufficiently formal. Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg,
and Sotomayor dissented and wrote a fierce critique of the plurality and
136
the concurring opinion.
Thus, between 2011 and 2014 the Court effectively changed its
position on forensic evidence and surrogate witnesses, and the combined
opinions of the plurality and concurrence have fostered increased
137
confusion regarding the application of the Confrontation Clause.
Whereas the testimonial nature of lab reports and the requirement for
the responsible lab analyst to testify was relatively clear under MelendezDiaz and Bullcoming, this shift and the division of the Williams Court
makes it unclear when forensic evidence is nontestimonial and when the
use of a surrogate witness is permissible. Consequently, the decision
substantially reduced defendants’ ability to effectively predict the
admissibility of forensic evidence.
A. The Facts
In Williams, the defendant, Sandy Williams, was convicted of
aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated robbery, and aggravated
138
kidnapping. The victim was taken from her car on her way home from
139
work and then raped and subsequently robbed. After the attack,
doctors treated her wounds and took a blood sample and a vaginal
140
swab. Confirming the presence of semen in the sample, the Illinois
State Police (“ISP”) laboratory sent the vaginal swab to Cellmark
141
Diagnostics, an independent laboratory, for DNA testing. Cellmark
returned a report to ISP containing a DNA profile produced from the

132. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
133. Id. at 2227.
134. Id. at 2228.
135. See id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 2264–77 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
137. See generally Michael H. Graham, Confrontation Clause: Williams Creates “Significant
Confusion” Prompting California Avoidance, 49 Crim. L. Bull. 1533 (2013) (explaining the confusion
in the legal landscape that the Williams opinion creates).
138. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2231.
139. Id. at 2229.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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semen, but at the time of the testing, ISP did not yet suspect Williams of
142
the rape.
Sandra Lambatos, a forensic specialist at ISP, conducted a computer
143
search and found a match to the Cellmark DNA profile. However,
Lambatos neither conducted the initial tests nor observed any of
144
Cellmark’s testing. The profile match was for a blood sample taken from
145
Williams after a previous, unrelated arrest. At Williams’ bench trial, the
prosecution did not call any of the analysts from Cellmark, nor was the
146
report admitted into evidence. Instead, the prosecution relied only on
147
the testimony of forensic witnesses from ISP.
Lambatos was among these witnesses, and in her testimony, she
148
relied on the Cellmark DNA profile. She explained that it is common
practice to rely on the reports of another expert and, specifically, that the
ISP regularly relied on Cellmark, an accredited crime lab, to expedite the
149
testing process. Lambatos testified that, based on her comparison of
the two profiles, the sample taken from the vaginal swab “matched”
150
Williams’ DNA. However, the testimony presented by Lambatos, and
the plurality’s subsequent characterization of her testimony,
oversimplified the process required to create a DNA sample like the one
151
provided by Cellmark.
While Lambatos conceded that the sample had been degraded, she
failed to call attention to the fact that the rape kit sample was a mixture
152
containing DNA from both the male attacker and the victim. Due to
the complexity of the sample, DNA mixture analysis requires greater
153
subjective interpretation. As a result, the Cellmark analysis, like the
tests in Bullcoming, required both substantial skill and subjective
determinations to interpret the results. Additionally, Lambatos failed to
reveal that male profiles other than Williams could have been consistent
154
with the vaginal swab mixture. While these limitations likely had only a
minimal effect on the probative value of the evidence, it is the

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2230.
145. Id. at 2229.
146. Id. at 2230.
147. Id. at 2229–30.
148. Id. at 2230.
149. See Hanasono, supra note 57, at 8.
150. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2227.
151. See D. H. Kaye, Williams v. Illinois (Part II: More Facts, from Outside the Record, and a
Question of Ethics), Forensic Sci., Stat. & L. (Dec. 15, 2011), http://for-sci-law-now.blogspot.com/2011/
12/williams-v-illinois-part-ii-more-facts.html.
152. Id.
153. See Itiel E. Dror & Greg Hampikian, Subjectivity and Bias in Forensic DNA Mixture Interpretation,
51 Sci. & Just. 204, 205 (2011).
154. Kaye, supra note 151.
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155

oversimplification that is problematic. For example, showing the
complexity of the testing process can help a jury recognize the possibility
of error. In a case of a less accurate match or more fallible testing methods,
information regarding the complexity of the testing method could keep a
jury from convicting an innocent person. Despite these dangers, the trial
court admitted Lambatos’ testimony and the jury convicted Williams,
156
which was ultimately upheld by the Court.
B. The Division
As previously noted, the Justices remained divided in Williams as
they were in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, but the dissent now
157
represented the plurality and the majority was now dissenting. Justice
Thomas continued to advocate for the formality distinction, developed in
158
Crawford, but determined that a signed and detailed report failed to
159
give rise to the requisite level of formality. With Justice Thomas’ vote,
160
the Court upheld Williams’ conviction. However, because Justice
161
Thomas disagreed with the plurality’s rationale, the guiding principle
162
for deciding similar cases was left unknown.
1.

The Plurality

The plurality of the Court decided the Cellmark report was
163
nontestimonial and did not give rise to Sixth Amendment protections.
First, the plurality determined that “this form of expert testimony does
not violate the Confrontation Clause because that provision has no
application to out-of-court statements that are not offered to prove the
164
‘truth of the matter asserted.’” Justice Alito maintained that Lambatos
used the Cellmark report only to establish that it contained a DNA
profile, and specifically, did not testify as to the accuracy of the profile
165
that was used to match Williams’ DNA. Accordingly, the report was

155. Id.
156. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct 2221, 2244 (2012).
157. See supra notes 127–34.
158. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (“An accuser who makes a formal statement
to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
acquaintance does not.”).
159. Williams, 132 S. Ct at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 2244.
161. Id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“As I explain below, I share the dissent’s view of the
plurality’s flawed analysis.”).
162. See Hanasono, supra note 57, at 11 (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court leaves state courts, such as
California’s Supreme Court, with little structured guidance as to the evaluation of out-of-court
statements sought to be introduced by the prosecution in criminal trials.”).
163. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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not offered for the truth of what it asserted, but instead was only offered
for the purpose of producing a match.
Furthermore, the plurality contended that even if the report had
been offered in such a way, it would still be admissible because it did not
166
target a specific individual. Justice Alito explained that “[t]he report
was sought not for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used against
petitioner . . . but for the purpose of finding a rapist who was on the
167
loose.” The testimony, therefore, was not utilized for “accusing a
168
targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct.” Here, the plurality
analogized the circumstances to the ongoing emergency in Davis v.
169
Washington. Like the 911 call in Davis, the primary purpose of the
Cellmark report was to apprehend a rapist and resolve an ongoing
170
emergency. Thus, the primary purpose was not to gather evidence against
Williams to be used at trial; rather, it was to apprehend a dangerous
171
criminal.
2.

The Concurrence

In his concurrence, Justice Thomas agreed that Lambatos’
172
testimony did not infringe on Williams’ Sixth Amendment right, yet
offered a completely different rationale than the plurality. Justice
Thomas asserted that the Cellmark report “lack[ed] the solemnity of an
affidavit or deposition” because it was “neither a sworn nor a certified
173
declaration of fact.” For this reason, he concluded that the report was
174
not testimonial and did not give rise to Sixth Amendment protections.
Justice Thomas went on to disagree with the remainder of the
plurality’s decision, especially their claim that the statements were not
175
introduced for the truth of the matter asserted. He stressed that
“statements introduced to explain the basis of an expert’s opinion are not
176
introduced for a plausible nonhearsay purpose,” and added that
“[t]here is no meaningful distinction between disclosing an out-of-court
statement so that the factfinder may evaluate the expert’s opinion and
177
disclosing that statement for its truth.” Here, Lambatos relied on the
Cellmark report for its truth to establish the DNA match and, therefore,

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 2243.
Id. at 2228.
Id. at 2242.
Id. at 2243.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 2260.
Id.
Id. at 2257–58.
Id. at 2257.
Id.
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by disclosing her evaluation of that report she disclosed the report for its
truth—evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible without
178
opportunity for cross-examination. In a similar fashion, Justice Thomas
rejected the plurality’s “targeted individual” rationale and asserted that
this approach “lacks any grounding in constitutional text, in history, or in
179
logic.” With such biting remarks, Justice Thomas’ concurrence, as
180
Justice Kagan keenly and repeatedly pointed out, resembled the
dissent much more than it resembled any form of agreement with the
plurality.
3.

The Dissent

Writing for the dissent, Justice Kagan addressed and rejected the
plurality’s contention that the Cellmark report was not offered for the
truth of the matter asserted, stating that “when a witness, expert or
otherwise, repeats an out-of-court statement as the basis for a
181
conclusion . . . the statement’s utility is then dependent on its truth.”
She explained that “[i]f the statement is true, then the conclusion based
182
on it is probably true; if not, not.” Consequently, Justice Kagan
expounded, “to determine the validity of the witness’ conclusion, the
factfinder must assess the truth of the out-of-court statement on which it
183
relies.” Accordingly, because Lambatos relied on the truth of the
Cellmark report to form her conclusions as to the existence of a match,
184
the prosecution essentially submitted the substance of that report. With
“a wink and a nod,” Justice Kagan asserted, the prosecution attempted to
circumvent the Confrontation Clause by entering only Lambatos’
185
testimony. Here, the dissent reiterated concerns about incompetent
analysts and argued that the plurality’s decision by admitting surrogate
186
testimony allowed these dangers to go unaddressed.
Additionally, Justice Kagan agreed with Justice Thomas that the
plurality’s targeted individual test lacked proper precedential
187
foundation. The dissent declared, “[w]here that test comes from is
anyone’s guess. . . . None of our cases has ever suggested that . . . the
188
statement must be meant to accuse a previously identified individual.”
Additionally, the plurality’s analogy to an ongoing emergency stretched

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 2258.
Id. at 2262.
See, e.g., id. at 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2268–69.
Id. at 2268.
Id. at 2268–69.
See id. at 2269–70.
Id. at 2270.
Id. at 2272.
Id. at 2273.
Id. at 2273–74.
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the doctrine too far, as the corresponding cases never address the routine
189
practices of laboratory analysts. Consequently, without requiring the
trial court to give Williams the opportunity to confront the Cellmark
analyst, the plurality’s decision allowed the prosecution to continue to
circumvent the Confrontation Clause despite the testimonial nature of
190
the out-of-court statement.
While the dissent considered Justice Thomas’ argument that the
191
Cellmark report was insufficiently formal, Justice Kagan asserted that
Justice Thomas’ opinion, if adopted, “would turn the Confrontation
Clause into a constitutional gee-gaw—nice for show, but of little
192
value.” Specifically, prosecutors could avoid confrontation by using the
193
right kind of forms and particular language. As Justice Kagan stated,
prosecutors can merely find the “magic words” to prevent reports from
194
being deemed “certified.” As a result, the Confrontation Clause would
be reduced to an insignificant procedural obstacle that could be easily
avoided by, for example, reducing the number of signatures on the
report.
C. The Confusion
With Justice Thomas’ concurrence, a total of five Justices rejected
the idea that statements, like those contained in the Cellmark report, are
not hearsay when offered to show the basis for the expert’s opinion.
Additionally, the same five Justices disagreed with the idea that the
Confrontation Clause does not apply to statements gathered for
prosecution when there is no individualized suspect. As Justice Kagan
pointed out, however, no five Justices agreed with any of the plurality’s
195
interpretations of the testimonial standard. Following the decision, it
could be gleaned that testimony might be admissible, as it was in
Williams, if it satisfies the plurality’s nontargeted individual test and fails
to have the requisite number of signatures and certifications that Justice
Thomas demands for formality. Thus, lower courts are left wondering
where the majority of the Court truly lies.
Just as Justice Kagan predicted, the Williams decision has
196
consequently left “significant confusion in [its] wake.” As the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals noted in United States v. Maxwell, “the Court’s

189. Id. at 2274.
190. Id. at 2272 (“The plurality thus would countenance the Constitution’s circumvention.”).
191. Id. at 2276.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 2272 (“What a neat trick—but really, what a way to run a criminal justice system. No
wonder five Justices reject it.”).
196. Id. at 2277.
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4-1-4 division left no clear guidance about how exactly an expert must
phrase its testimony about the results of testing performed by another
197
analyst in order for the testimony to be admissible.” Consequently,
courts have utilized various methods of interpretation to deal with
confusion in the aftermath of Williams. Some have decided that Williams
198
is only binding in its narrow circumstances and results, while others
have chosen to ignore the Williams decision all together. For example, in
United States v. James, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined
199
that Williams created no binding precedent. Others, notably state
courts, have resorted to more mathematical methods.
IV. A Comparative Look at State Responses
Similarly frustrated by the Williams decision, some state courts have
found a mathematical form of abiding by the Court’s vague ruling,
predicting the voting of each Justice until a principle that will garner five
200
votes is discovered. As Michael H. Graham noted in his article, “[i]t is
self-evident from recent reported California Supreme Court opinions
that the California Supreme Court has simply run out of patience with
the U.S. Supreme Court’s inability to fashion a coherent logical, practical
201
interpretation of the confrontation clause.” To manage this confusion
over the admissibility of surrogate testimony for autopsy reports, the
California Supreme Court and the New Mexico Supreme Court
implemented a system referred to, for the purposes of this Note, as head202
counting. Specifically, head-counting occurs when the courts determine
the admissibility of testimony by calculating whether five or more U.S.
Supreme Court Justices would agree to the inclusion of specific testimony.
The following Subparts explore New Mexico’s and California’s application
of Williams and analyze their results.

197. United States v. Maxwell, 724 F.3d 724, 727 (7th Cir. 2013).
198. See Hanasono, supra note 57, at 10–11 (exploring the various interpretations of the Williams
decision).
199. See United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 2013).
200. Because a bare majority of the Court determines the outcome of the case head counting or
“counting noses” appears to be generally accepted and widely used. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Five to
Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?, 123 Yale L.J. 1692, 1703 n.39, 1724 (2014) (quoting
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Are Judges Really More Principled than Voters?, 37 U.S.F. L. Rev. 37, 58–59
(2002)) (“Because the Justices are political equals: we assess the quality of argument by counting
noses.”). But, as demonstrated by the decisions in Dungo and Naverette, this method can lead to
contradictory results.
201. Graham, supra note 137, at 1541.
202. See State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 437 (N.M. 2013); People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 455–56
(Cal. 2012) (Chin, J., concurring).
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A. PEOPLE V. DUNGO
In Dungo, the defendant was charged with the murder of his
203
girlfriend Lucinda Correia Pina. The defendant admitted to the crime,
but argued at trial that he killed her in the heat of passion and without
204
malice, and as a result the prosecution offered the testimony of forensic
205
pathologist Robert Lawrence to refute this claim. Lawrence testified
206
that Pina had died of “asphyxia caused by strangulation,” further
explaining that because Pina’s hyoid bone—the bone located in front of
207
the neck and between the lower jaw and the larynx —was not fractured,
she had in fact been continuously strangled for “more than two
208
minutes.” With this information, the prosecution argued that the
defendant “could not have been acting in the heat of passion for that length
of time and that therefore the killing was murder rather than
209
manslaughter.”
Lawrence, however, did not conduct the autopsy; rather, pathologist
210
George Bolduc performed the autopsy on Pina’s body. The prosecution
211
did not indicate that Bolduc was unavailable to testify at trial and,
moreover, it was revealed during a pretrial evidentiary hearing that
Bolduc had been fired from his position in Kern County and had
212
resigned from Orange County “under a cloud.” In a corresponding
footnote, the California Supreme Court surreptitiously explained that
“under a cloud” meant that Bolduc was suspected of “basing his
conclusion regarding the cause of death on a police report rather than on
213
medical evidence.” Although the trial judge permitted the defendant to
214
cross-examine Lawrence about Bolduc’s qualifications, confronting a
credible surrogate witness would likely not have the same impact as
crossing the pathologist directly responsible for producing fraudulent
work.
Ultimately, the majority of the California Supreme Court determined
that the information relayed by Lawrence was informal and that the
215
primary purpose of the autopsy was not for criminal investigation. First,

203. Dungo, 286 P.3d at 444–45.
204. Id. at 445–46.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 446.
207. Hyoid Bone, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/279422/
hyoid-bone (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
208. Dungo, 286 P.3d at 446.
209. Id. at 445.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 445–46.
213. Id. at 445 n.2.
214. Id. at 446.
215. Id. at 450.
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the court explained that statements that record objective facts are less
216
formal than statements that introduce a pathologist’s conclusions.
Here, the court reasoned that Bolduc’s report was more appropriately
217
In her
categorized as observations rather than conclusions.
concurrence, Justice Werdegar further emphasized that the autopsy
218
report was not “sworn or certified.” Second, the court maintained that
the autopsy was not prepared with the primary purpose of prosecution,
but rather in accordance with the governing statute that requires
219
inquiries into the cause of death for a number of various circumstances.
The court explained that “the scope of the coroner’s statutory duty to
investigate is the same, regardless of whether the death resulted from
220
criminal activity.” The autopsy report, therefore, had several purposes,
221
including but not limited to the use in prosecution.
The court maintained that the defendant did not have the right to
222
confront Bolduc, the actual preparer of the autopsy, and consequently,
223
Dungo’s confrontation right had not been violated. As Justice Chin
clearly asserted, “[i]t took a combination of two opinions [the Williams
plurality and Justice Thomas’ concurrence]—each containing quite
224
different reasoning—to achieve the majority result.” The court applied
a test that would satisfy one Justice and four Justices separately, but
would never satisfy a uniform majority of the Supreme Court. As a
consequence of the divided Williams Court, the decision in Dungo
represents a somewhat piecemeal application of the Confrontation
Clause doctrine.
In her dissent, Justice Corrigan attacked the foundation of the
majority’s decision by sharply explaining that the majority’s distinction
between observations and conclusions was previously rejected in
225
Bullcoming. Additionally, she asserted that, while the primary purpose
of some autopsies may not be prosecutorial, other circumstances may
226
well give rise to the production of testimonial statements. The question

216. Id. at 449.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 452 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
219. Id. at 450; see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 27291 (West 2016) (“It shall be the duty of the coroner to
inquire into and determine the circumstances, manner, and cause of all violent, sudden, or unusual
deaths. . . .”).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 444.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 455 (Chin, J., concurring); see also id. at 456 (“[W]e must identify and apply a test which
satisfies the requirement of both Justice [Alito’s] plurality opinion and Justice [Thomas’s]
concurrence.”).
225. Id. at 463 (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 466.
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then was whether Bolduc’s report was testimonial. In response to this,
due in large part to the presence of the police during the autopsy, Justice
Corrigan determined that Bolduc’s primary purpose was to prepare
228
statements for use in a criminal trial. Accordingly, she concluded that
229
the testimony violated the Confrontation Clause.
B. STATE V. NAVARETTE
In a similar case in New Mexico, Reylando Ornelas was shot and
230
killed while leaning into the open driver’s side window of a parked car.
Navarette, who was in the passenger’s seat of the car during the incident,
231
claimed that the driver was the shooter. The prosecution called Dr.
232
Ross Zumwalt to testify as to the cause and manner of death, even
though Dr. Mary Dudley performed the autopsy and Zumwalt “neither
233
participated nor observed Dr. Dudley perform the autopsy.” Despite
Zumwalt’s absence from the autopsy procedure, he testified that Dudley
234
“followed the standard procedure for performing autopsies.”
Additionally, Zumwalt concluded, based on the autopsy report and the
photographs of the body, that due to the absence of soot and stippling,
the gun was not within two feet of Ornelas when the shooter fired the
235
gun. With this testimony, the prosecution argued that the shooter could
236
not have been the driver.
In this case, the New Mexico Supreme Court was explicit about its
head-count technique. The court explained, “[o]ur examination of
Crawford and its progeny reveals that at least five justices of the [U.S.]
Supreme Court have agreed upon the following principles that we
conclude are essential to a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
237
analysis.” The opinion then methodically introduced each principle,
which the court believed had gained the favor of five Justices. The U.S.
238
Supreme Court established five of these principles prior to Williams.
To discern the other principles, as in Dungo, the Court attempted to
239
reconcile the division of the Williams Court. Here, rather than utilizing
the plurality and the concurring opinion in Williams, the New Mexico

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
Id. at 466–67.
Id.
State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 436 (N.M. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 437.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 437–39 (establishing the principles identified as the first, second, third, fifth, and sixth).
Id. at 439.
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Supreme Court ultimately followed only those principles accepted by a
uniform majority of the U.S. Supreme Court. In fact, the court in
Navarette discussed three principles established by taking the dissenting
240
and concurring opinion of the Williams decision.
The first of these principles asserts that “even if a statement (in this
case, a forensic report), does not target a specific individual, the
241
statement may still be testimonial.” In Williams, both Justices Thomas
and Kagan rejected the plurality’s choice to make reports nontestimonial
242
if they were not targeted at a specific individual. Second, “the fact that
an out-of-court statement (in this case, the forensic report) is not
243
inherently inculpatory does not make it nontestimonial.” Again in
Williams, both Justices Kagan and Thomas refused to recognize the
distinction between “inherently inculpatory” statements and those that
244
are “merely helpful.” Justice Kagan asserted that the plurality could
not “gain any purchase from the idea that a DNA profile is not
245
inherently inculpatory.” Third, “an out-of-court statement that is
disclosed to the fact-finder as the basis for an expert’s opinion is offered
246
for the truth of the matter asserted.” The dissenting opinion and Justice
Thomas’ concurring opinion agreed that the report, which acted as the
basis of the testifying witness’ knowledge, was in fact offered for the
247
truth of the matter asserted.
Relying on these principles, the court determined that Zumwalt’s incourt statements related testimonial hearsay and therefore, violated
248
Navarette’s confrontation right. The court explained that it was selfevident that the statements Dudley made in the autopsy report were
249
prepared for use at trial. The controlling New Mexico statutes, section
24-11-5 and section 24-11-8, provided that “any . . . sudden, violent or
untimely death[,] . . . the cause of which is unknown, shall [be] report[ed]
250
. . . to law enforcement,” and a “medical investigator shall promptly
report his findings . . . to the district attorney in each death
251
investigated.” As a result, Dudley should have reasonably foreseen the

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 438–39.
Id.
Id. at 439.
Id.
Id.
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2274 n.5 (2012).
Navarette, 294 P.3d at 439.
Id.
Id. at 444.
Id. at 440.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-11-5 (West 2016).
Id. § 24-11-8.
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252

use of the report at trial.
Consequently, the statements were
253
testimonial and inadmissible unless Dudley testified at trial.
C. The Comparison
In both Dungo and Navarette, surrogate witnesses presented the
254
results of autopsies performed by other forensic pathologists, yet the
courts came to contrary results regarding the admissibility of that
testimony. In Dungo, the court deemed the testimony of the surrogate
255
witness sufficient and in Navarette, the court concluded that the
256
surrogate testimony violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.
The circumstances of these cases are quite similar, both pathology
reports were similarly formal and prepared for trial, and both cases
presented dangers the Court sought to restrict prior to the Williams
decision, namely, the danger of deficient or fraudulent forensic science.
First, the intent for prosecution is essentially the same in both cases.
The statutes in California and New Mexico both require autopsies be
257
performed in the event of a violent death. While, as the court noted,
the California Government Code requires autopsy reports in a variety of
circumstances, irregularity or violence appear to be the underlying
258
factors for the listed conditions. For example, the first lines read: “It shall
be the duty of the coroner to inquire into and determine the circumstances,
259
manner, and cause of all violent, sudden, or unusual deaths.”
Consequently, similar to the explicit requirement in the New Mexico
statute, the California Code implicitly mandates autopsies in criminal
situations. Therefore, although there may be other purposes for determining
the cause and manner of death, the primary purpose of the autopsy reports
in both of these cases appear to be use in prosecution.
Moreover, autopsies are important tools for prosecution in
260
general. In fact, in homicide cases, the autopsy is typically the central
261
piece of incriminating evidence. A pathologist could plainly predict,
especially in a case of a violent death through strangulation or a gunshot
wound, the use of that autopsy report in a criminal prosecution.
Consequently, regardless of the individual circumstances of a case,

252. Navarette, 294 P.3d at 441.
253. Id. at 444.
254. See id. at 436; see also People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 445–46 (Cal. 2012).
255. Dungo, 286 P.3d at 444.
256. Navarette, 294 P.3d at 444.
257. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 27491 (West 2016); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-11-5 (West 2016).
258. Cal. Gov’t Code § 27491 (West 2016).
259. Id.
260. Andrew Higley, Tales of the Dead: Why Autopsy Reports Should Be Classified as Testimonial
Statements Under the Confrontation Clause, 48 New. Eng. L. Rev. 171, 172 (2013).
261. Id.
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autopsy reports appear to inherently fall within the category of
foreseeable use at trial.
Second, the reports are also similarly formal. As Justice Corrigan
outlines in her dissent, Bolduc’s autopsy report bore the badge of the San
Joaquin County Sheriff, had “Coroner’s Autopsy Report” on the upper
right of every page, and included Bolduc’s name at the bottom of each
262
page. Further, the physical report had the appearance of formality
263
similar to that described in Bullcoming. Because the New Mexico
Supreme Court justices focused on the primary purpose of the autopsy
report, the opinion does not describe in detail the appearance of the report.
However, the statements within the report as to the manner and cause of
264
death are similar to those produced by Bolduc. The statements, therefore,
are likely similar in formality.
Finally, both cases represent the dangers of forensic evidence that
the Court worked to guard against. In Melendez-Diaz, Justice Scalia
asserted that confrontation could expose analysts with improper or
265
insufficient training and any deficiencies in judgment. Justice Ginsburg
further endorsed this reasoning in Bullcoming, explaining that “surrogate
testimony [could not] expose any lapses or lies on the certifying analyst’s
266
part.” The Court in these cases worked to guard against forensic
evidence that might have deficiencies due to the analyst’s faulty judgment
or mistaken interpretations, as might have been the case with Navarette.
In Navarette, the pathologist, Zumwalt, made conclusions as to the
267
position of the shooter based on the absence of stippling and soot.
Stippling “consists of multiple punctate abrasions of the skin due to the
268
impact of small fragments of foreign material” and has been subject to
269
For example, some critics have stated that
scientific critiques.
“[g]unpowder residue is usually associated with a distance of contact up
to 12 in[ches]. The determination of distance by counting burned and
270
unburned powder indentations is arbitrary at best.” Thus, a determination
as to the distance at which a gun was fired can require a great deal of
subjective interpretation. In fact, the court in Navarette conceded that
262. People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 463–64 (Cal. 2012) (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 464.
264. Compare id. at 446 (majority opinion) (explaining that the autopsy report contained
photographs and a description of the body), and State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 437 (N.M. 2013)
(stating that the autopsy report contained photographs and a description of the victim’s injuries).
265. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 320 (2009).
266. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2011).
267. Navarette, 294 P.3d at 437.
268. Vincent J.M. Di Maio, Gunshot Wounds: Practical Aspects of Firearms, Ballistics, and
Forensic Techniques 103 (2d ed. 1999).
269. John Louis Larsen & Arthur H. Borchers, Handguns: Range of Fire and Gunpowder Stippling,
Evidence Tech. Mag. (2008), http://www.evidencemagazine.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=
view&id=1119.
270. Id.
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271

exact fact. Stippling analysis, therefore, presents substantial risk of
deficiencies, both in training and judgment, just as Justice Scalia
272
discussed in Melendez-Diaz.
Any dangers of incompetence in Dungo, on the other hand, are not
as apparent. Unlike Navarette, as the court in Dungo contended, the
determination of whether a bone is broken requires less interpretation
273
and more objective observations. Something such as a broken bone, for
example, is less likely to be incorrectly or incompetently analyzed.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the Confrontation
Clause protects defendants against fraudulent attacks as well as
incompetent ones. For instance, in Melendez-Diaz, Justice Scalia
contended that the Confrontation Clause was designed to awaken the
274
conscience of fraudulent witnesses.
So, though the subjective interpretation required in Dungo is less
than that in Navarette, this does not eliminate the danger of fraud. In
Dungo, the danger of fraudulent reports seems substantially higher than
in Navarette. While there was no evidence of fraud in Dungo, the
275
suspicious history of Bolduc raised concerns of repeated questionable
practices, information that would have been important to introduce to
the jury. In this way, the dangers of testimonial hearsay that the
Confrontation Clause is specifically designed to inhibit are present in
276
both cases.
Overall, despite the fact that Navarette and Dungo presented similar
circumstances and posed similar hearsay dangers, the cases produced
contrary results. Quite simply, the cases demonstrate that Williams can
be used in a multitude of ways. Courts can choose from a variety of
different interpretations to base their opinions. Thus, the question is not
how can Williams be used, but rather, how should it be used.
V. Limiting the Impact of the WILLIAMS Decision
By relying on the plurality’s rationale and Justice Thomas’
concurrence, the court in Dungo failed to follow principles established by
the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court. Rather, the Dungo court
satisfied four Justices and one Justice separately and, consequently,
overemphasized the importance of those conflicting opinions,
particularly by exaggerating the significance of formality. The plurality
and concurring opinions not only lack majority support, but also fail to
address the dangers of forensic science that the Court intended to
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Navarette, 294 P.3d at 443.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 320 (2009).
People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 449 (Cal. 2012).
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318.
Dungo, 286 P.3d at 445–46.
See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318–20.
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safeguard against via the exclusion of surrogate testimony. Specifically, it
fails to protect against those dangers that lead to wrongful convictions.
First, formality “will not guarantee honesty, proficiency, or
277
methodology.” The number of labels or signatures, in other words,
cannot prevent incompetent or fraudulent work. Certification does not
278
Second, ongoing
“make any laboratory technician infallible.”
emergencies like the 911 call in Davis may have greater assurances of
honesty because they are not provided for trial but seek aid in dangerous
circumstances. Yet the “ongoing emergency” represented in Williams is
not similarly situated. There, the forensic analyst had ample time to
make mistakes or lie. Finally, Lambatos’ analysis relied on the accuracy
of the Cellmark report and consequently her testimony as to the
existence of a match, affirmed that accuracy for the jury. As Justice
Kagan explained, “[i]f the statement is true, then the conclusion based on
279
it is probably true; if not, not.” However, Lambatos’ testimony alone
does not demonstrate the quality or honesty of the Cellmark report.
Only by cross-examining the preparer of the Cellmark report and the
individual who established the subsequent match could the defendant
establish if one or the other engaged in fraudulent acts during the
production of the material. Thus, the rationales supported by the
plurality and concurrence inadequately protect defendants from
incompetent or fraudulent forensic evidence.
As a result, courts should act to limit the impact of the Williams’
plurality and concurring opinion by relying on those principles truly
supported by a majority of the Court. In the context of forensic science
and surrogate witnesses, this requires that defendants be afforded the
right to confront analysts directly responsible for the production of
evidentiary materials, whether those materials are used to directly accuse
the defendant or indirectly implicate the defendant through comparative
processes like DNA matching. By adhering to this majority, lower courts
can ensure that the principles followed will protect the Confrontation
Clause.
280
Overall, if Williams v. Illinois is to be followed at all, it should be
treated as a narrow exception, not the rule. Instead, emphasis should be
placed on principles supported prior to Williams and those standards
within Williams that were supported by five unified Justices, namely
those principles identified by the dissent.

277. See Hanasono, supra note 57, at 19.
278. Id. at 20.
279. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2268 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
280. See, e.g., United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (determining that Williams
created no binding precedent).
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Conclusion
281

In general, courts are often leery of excluding evidence. What is
more, they are particularly hesitant to exclude autopsy reports for fear of
282
creating a “statute of limitations on murder.” Additionally, as a result
of the Williams decision, courts have been forced to create piecemeal
standards for the Confrontation Clause. They must now pick and choose
standards that they hope will be upheld. For example in People v.
Dungo, the court chose principles introduced in Williams that only have
the support of four Justices, or perhaps even just one Justice, in order to
admit the condemning evidence.
As a consequence, the U.S. Supreme Court has left defendants
vulnerable to inconsistent applications of the Sixth Amendment and
perhaps greater inclusion of faulty forensic science. Depending on what
state or district a defendant is in, she may be protected by a substantially
weaker confrontation right than if she happened to be somewhere else.
This approach does not sufficiently guard against the hearsay dangers
addressed in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. Nor does this approach
protect innocent defendants from wrongful convictions. Therefore, while
the cutting comments that are rife in the dissent’s opinion make the
Williams case interesting to read, the overwhelming confusion created by
this decision necessitates a second look. Hopefully future decisions from
the Supreme Court will not only clarify the current confusion but also
reinforce the Confrontation Clause, as its impact has been significantly
diminished with the varying applications of Williams.
In the interim, however, courts should employ restraint. Rather than
overemphasizing the formality requirement championed by Justice
Thomas, as California did in People v. Dungo, courts should follow the
lead of New Mexico as in State v. Navarette. That is, they should err on
the side of exclusion and protecting the defendant’s confrontation rights
by focusing on the rationales agreed to by five Justices. This will help to
preserve the force of the Confrontation Clause and stop it from
becoming a simple gee-gaw.

281. See Douglass, supra note 5, at 220.
282. Ginsberg, supra note 10, at 119.
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